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This paper deals with emerging and evolving institutionalization of the European security field 
through the lens of Bourdieu’s practice theory. This field is in flux since broad notions of security 
have taken centre stage together with more traditional security threats. Former domestic 
security issues such as illegal immigration, natural disasters, terrorism and crime - all elements 
of the new risk-society - are rapidly taking over the security agenda, which used to be 
dominated by objective (military) threats to collective security. This development, the interaction 
between internal and external securitization, is of major importance to the main actors in the 
European security field - NATO and the EU – as well as to the field itself. In this paper we will 
argue that both actors use securitization techniques in order to define and redefine the 
European security field; thus making issues part of the security field by securitizing them and 
subsequently imposing this new vision of social reality on other actors in the field. However, 
securitization's speech act and action alone are not enough to understand the dynamics. Only 
within certain social conditions such efforts can be successful, thus understanding requires the 
analysis of action, agency and structure. We will make use of Pierre Bourdieu's practice theory 
in order to analyse changes in the field and its boundaries - i.e. the definition of security – the 
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rules and regulations ("doxa"), the importance of different power resources ("capital") and the 
power and influence of both actors. Our aim is to understand how the adaptation of NATO and 
the EU to changes has affected the positioning of the security organizations, the 
institutionalisation and the properties of the field itself. 
 
1 Bourdieu's practice theory and securitization 
 
In this paper, we will make use of Bourdieu’s practice theory in order to comprehend 
developments in the European Security field. Bourdieu’s sociological framework transcends the 
classical divide between idealism and materialism, and bridges agent and structure-oriented 
approaches (Guzzini, 2006: 1; Mérand, 2010: 343; Swartz, 1997: 7). It goes beyond 
overemphasis on norms and perceptions on the one hand, and on materialist notions of power 
and balance of power on the other (Villumsen, 2011: 3). It is, moreover, a process-oriented 
approach, which is  appropriate for research on continuity and change in the European security 
field. 
In order to connect agent and structure, Bourdieu’s framework uses the concept 
"habitus" - schemes of perception and action - which strongly resembles social-psychological 
notions such as “schemata” and “belief systems" (Larson, 1994; Lizardo, 2004; Mérand, 2010). 
Habitus is therefore more than just a group of preferred orderings and strategies; it can be 
regarded as a central idea on how the world works, one’s own place within it as well as “a sense 
of others' place.” (Bourdieu, 1987: 156). Moreover, it is not easily changed, since it occurs as a 
result of social interaction and socialization. This also means that habitus exists independently 
from the individual, and results from and resides in social structures of a particular social and 
political context. 
By observation, acting and experiencing the consequences, an actor learns and 
internalizes the habitus of a field, consciously or unconsciously. The habitus thus becomes a 
second nature to the actor – a habit – that influences his worldview, expectations and (strategic) 
behaviour. However, this does not prevent change as the habitus is in constant state of 
development. It adapts to changing circumstances within the field in order to remain useful to 
reach the actor’s objectives: the habitus is durable but not static (Jackson, 2008: 164-165). 
Habitus in Bourdieu's framework is a practical tool that enables an actor to act properly in a 
particular social and political context (Swartz, 1997: 115). 
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This social and political context is labelled a “field”, the second important concept in 
Bourdieu’s framework. Society, according to this framework, consists of different fields or arenas 
- such as an economic field, political field, a scientific field and a security field - where different 
games are played with different rules and regulations. The field concept points towards a limited 
social context in which the actors are embedded and whereupon their actions are aimed. Like a 
game, each field has its own rules and regulations, its own objectives, values and strategies on 
how to play (Jackson, 2008, 167). Bourdieu’s notion of a field bears resemblance to the same 
concept in physics, since he describes it as a well-structured space or system in which actors 
are interconnected and in which a change in position leads to changes in the field as a whole, 
as for instance in a magnetic field (Sallaz en Zavisca, 2007: 24). 
However, there is more to it. Fields can be considered arenas wherein actors compete 
for power or, in the terminology of Bourdieu, “capital”. This conflict can be fought over various 
kinds of capital: economic, cultural, scientific or symbolic – this differs from field to field. Within a 
field actors are related to each other based on their relative position. A field can therefore be 
characterised as a structure of dominant and subordinate positions based on different types of 
capital and its appreciation. The struggle is not only on the relative position of the actors but also 
on more profound issues like the question of what the most appropriate and valued capital is in 
a field, and who is able to determine this: “it is therefore not what you say but where [with what 
resources of power] you say it from that matters.” (Villumsen, 2010: 16) Legitimacy is thus part 
of this struggle: “Every field is the site of a more or less overt struggle over the definition of the 
legitimate principles of the division of the field.” (Bourdieu, 1985: 734).  
The most important objective that structures a field is the “illusio”. It is the aim around 
which actors organize themselves and develop their goal-oriented strategies. It is the reason, 
shared by all actors in the field, why the struggle is accepted and participating considered 
worthwhile; the reason why actors are committed to play the game: “Every field stimulates a 
certain interest, an illusio, in the shape of an implicit recognition of what is at stake in the field 
and how the actors in the field play the field power game.” (Bourdieu 2005: 9). Illusio therefore 
defines the important cleavages that characterize the field, or, in the words of Bourdieu, “the 
principles of vision and division”. In the political field, as Mérand (2010: 351) exemplifies, the 
illusio would be the politician’s aspiration to get elected, while the progressive-conservative and 
left-right dimensions would be assumed to be the most important cleavages. 
Finally, a specific field forces a specific form of struggle on the actor, which is, 
consciously or unconsciously, learned as soon as the actor enters the field. Both the dominant 
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elite and the subordinate challengers share the rules and regulations that are contested and 
which capital counts. These shared assumptions on the structures and the rules and logic that 
governs a field are called “doxa”. According to Villumsen (2011: 24) this is “the unspoken, 
common knowledge which constitutes social reality and which exercises a misrecognised 
structural power on the practices in a field.” The doxa of a field, however, is not everlasting. As 
long as it is sustained in practice, it will persevere, but it is possible that even these deep-seated 
assumptions are challenged in this struggle, especially “in a situation in which the existing doxa 
has lost its power to structure the field.” (Villumsen, 2011: 24; Swartz, 1997: 89) These struggles 
are called doxic battles, in which the contestants try to impose on the others their specific 
definition of the legitimate principles of the division of the field. 
All things considered, actor and structure cannot be analysed separately. Within the 
European security field for example, the strategies of NATO and EU can only be understood in 
the context of their position within this field. As Mérand (2010) rightly points out, one can usually 
distinguish two types of actors: (a) the presiding actor, who dominates the field and has an 
interest in maintaining the status quo, and (b) the challenger, who is focused on change, but is 
usually not able to accomplish this. The strategy an actor uses, his political action, arises from 
the habitus and the associated position of the actor in the field. In other words, political action is 
constituted by the actor’s habitus and capital, and the field in which he operates. Political action, 
according to Bourdieu, “aims to make or unmake groups – and by the same token the collective 
actions they can undertake to transform the social world in accordance with their interests – by 
producing, reproducing or destroying the representations that make groups visible for 
themselves and others” (Bourdieu, 1991: 127). This enabled NATO to dominate the European 
security field for 40 years without problems.  
The position of the dominant actor may, however, be undermined by unexpected or 
powerful external developments, for instance when a field is struck by crisis. The prevailing 
balance of power is shifting and the deeper structures and rules of the field - the doxa – are 
losing their utility, causing tension between the durable, slow-adapting, schemes of perception 
and action - the habitus - and the hierarchy between the actors (Mérand, 2010 : 352). This 
window of opportunity provides prospects for other players to change the rules of the game 
towards their interest in line with the habitus of other actors. In the security field, doxic battles 
can be fought with help of acts of securitization and desecuritization - discursive strategies 
aimed at defining security. By securitizng certain threats, an actor can enhance his position in 
the security field by validating his own capital. The theory of securitization assumes an actor to 
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European Security Field(Habitus x Capital)  Political Action and Securitization 
Figure 1: securitization and Bourdieu’s theory of power and practice 
have enough authority and legitimacy to securitize a certain threat by ‘speech act’ (Buzan, 
Waever, De Wilde, 1998). Bourdieu’s practice theory indicates that an actor needs a certain 
position within the hierarchical structure of a field in order to be heard and accepted. The theory 
of Bourdieu offers therefore a useful context to the theory of securitization (see figure 1). 
 
 
It is obvious that after the end of the Cold War the European security field is 
characterized by a severe crisis. NATO is losing its dominant position, while the doxa of the 
security field has become instable. Before 1989, military capital, supported by economic capital, 
was the main source of power and European security was defined by the balance of power and 
geographic distance (Villumsen, 2010: 21). Since that time the field is in flux and it still has not 
reached its cold war stability. The European security field is an arena where the two dominant 
players - NATO and EU – struggle to define the field’s doxa. Central to this is the battle for the 
definition of security and related issues. According to the theory of Bourdieu, the two actors will 
therefore define security in such a way to match their own interests. Hence, through 
communication and praxis, NATO and EU try to exercise substantial influence on the dominant 
and widely accepted answers to the following questions: (i) what is security? (ii) who are the 
main players (the limits of the field and the hierarchy within the field)? (iii) which capital is 
important?, and (iv) which structures and rules define the field? 
 
2 Agent and structure 
 
2.1 The EU and the European security field 
The EU is the new kid on the block of the European security field. The EU’s role in European 
security starts earlier than 1999, when the European Council decided to create the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now a ‘common’ policy, therefore titled CSDP). Ever since 
the 1950s the EU has incrementally developed from an economic actor into one that is 
increasingly also a foreign and security policy actor. However, the position and role of the EU of 
importance for the contemporary security field is related to the EU’s participation on the security 
field from 1999. The positioning relative to the dominant NATO and particularly the United States 
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have been determining as the EU was a newcomer whose relevance, position and capital on 
the security field had to be proven and conquered (Mérand, 2010). It is of importance to 
highlight the complexity and distinctiveness of the EU as a player on the security field, since this 
strongly determines the EU’s habitus.  
Several factors determine the complexity of the EU as a security actor. One of them is 
that the EU has several faces in security policy issues. This is not only the case in the EU’s 
external representation (the High Representative on CFSP Catherine Ashton, the Commission 
president José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy 
and the country that has the EU-presidency), but also in security policy making. The 
competences in the area of security are located within the intergovernmentally organized 
Council, the supranational Commission and in an entity which finds itself in between, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) (Drent and Zandee 2010). At the end of the day it is 
the 27 member states which determine the priorities and the so called ‘red lines’ of security and 
defence policies with influential positions of the three larger countries, the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany.  
This multiplicity on representation and competence render the EU a complex security 
actor (Rieker, 2007).  However, in terms of a Bourdieusian field the EU’s discursive presence, its 
security practice and influence are a reality. The EU is routinely considered as one of the two 
most important security organisations in Europe and has therewith the power to (co-)determine 
the nature of the field. Another complication is that besides the field in which the EU is an actor, 
the EU itself also forms an arena in which the struggle for power to determine the dominant 
definition of security also takes place. (Simmerl, 2010). This internal struggle on the nature and 
shape of the EU as a security actor on the one hand hampers the positioning of the EU in the 
security field, but is on the other hand a constitutive contribution of the EU to the same security 
field: the hybridism and multiplicity of the EU is reflected within the security field itself.  
The influence of the EU in the redefinition of the doxa after the end of the Cold War 
predominantly shows in the legitimization of the typical civilian oriented EU-expertise as relevant 
for the security field (cf. Leander, 2005, 811-812). The EU is by origin a purely civilian power, 
which shapes its increasing international-political presence particularly in the further 
development of international law based order. The instruments of foreign policy traditionally are  
development cooperation, international trade and 'normative diplomacy' (to assist countries in 
reaching standards of human rights, the rule of law and democracy). In the course of the last ten 
years these instruments at the disposal of the EU have been completed by the military 
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instrument (ESS, 2003). Indeed, ever since the 1990s the departure from the classical threat 
perception of a breach of territorial integrity has been apparent. The social field of security in 
Europe saw a shift in what constitutes capita . While the European Union had from its birth in 
the 1950s been about peace, security and welfare among its members, (Rogers, 2009: 840), it 
was not until the 1990s that this internal provision of security also gained an external dimension 
with a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a Common Security and Defence Policy. The 
EU is now a much broader security actor than NATO and has therefore also fronted its versatility 
as an argument for the legitimation of the EU's position in the security field. It is in the interest of 
the EU to transform the nature of the security field to one where the competences in the area of 
the classic, external security are not of sole relevance, but one in which capital is represented 
by a broad concept of security.  
The development of the EU as a security actor reflects to a great extent the maneuvering 
for a good position in the security field. In the period from 1999 the EU positioned itself as a 
military actor, striving to have “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so (...)” (European 
Council, 1999). The ambitions for a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60.000 troops and later 
on the Battlegroups are indicative of this. Also, during the deliberations in 2002 in the European 
convention on a constitutional treaty, which in 2009 was accepted in a watered down form as 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU was positioned as a collective defence actor. The WEU Art. V was 
introduced into the Treaty on European Union as a mutual defence clause and stipulated that  
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States. (Art 42.7 TEU, 2009).  
The rivalry with NATO's position as the collective defence organization since 1949 is obvious 
and it is remarkable that the wording of the rejected constitutional treaty has found its way into 
the Treaty of Lisbon unaltered. However, here practice meets discourse and it turns out that this 
mutual defence clause and its implications have been ignored by policy makers. In most cases, 
the policy makers of 2002 were not the same as the ones who were confronted with the final 
Treaty text in 2009 and the latter chose not to pursue this conflictual clause to NATO's 
prerogative of collective defence.  
Already at the beginning of the development of ESDP, internal opposition against the 
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'militarisation' of the EU grew, particularly from the side of member states with a civilian security 
identity. But the initial 'military EU' discourse also changed because European member states 
experienced the limitations of their material capacities (Smith, 2000). In 2003 the European 
security strategy already shows a clear civilian-military orientation:  
“(...) based on an enlarged vision of security and on a comprehensive, multilateral and 
internationally legitimated approach to threats, implying the use of all sorts of instruments 
(military and civilian) in an integrated manner” (Biava, Drent, 2011: 1243). This reorientation was 
also caused by the fact that the EU was not going to be able to compete with NATO in the area 
of 'hard' security and key member states were continuously stressing NATO as the foundation of 
collective defence. Consequently, the EU repositions itself and makes better use of its symbolic 
capital by emphasizing the security discourse of 'integrated security'. In its crisis management 
operations the EU stresses the 'added value' (particularly in relation to NATO) of its integrated 
approach. The EU is capable to also deploy civilian capabilities for crisis management and also 
often makes use of them. In the operational phase of CSDP from 2003 eighteen out of twenty-
five operations were of civilian character. This coincides with the growing acknowledgement that 
internal and external security threats are interrelated and therefore need to be addressed by a 
mixture of means that were traditionally regarded as part of the external (military) and internal 
(police, justice, border security,  disaster relief) security sectors. Hence, the discursive strategy 
of the EU of stressing the integrated character of threats and means to counter them can be 
described as one of a 'doubly' integrated security discourse.    
This 'double integrated security discourse' with an internal/external and civilian and military 
dimension also has a clear resonance with the threat perceptions of the European security elite. 
A study by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows a high degree of convergence in 
the area of perceived threats: the economic crisis, uncontrolled migration and climate change 
(Leonard and Krastev, 2010: 24-8). 'Societal security' appears to be determining  for the security 
perceptions of the European elite (Bigo, 2002 CHECK). In the context of the EU, which is less 
influenced by the United States than that of NATO,  the security concept appears civilian and 
societal oriented.  
The externalisation of internal security objectives in the EU is a trend that reflects this 
integrated security discourse and which has influenced the EU's position on the security field 
(Monar, 2010). Internal security challenges of the EU, such as organised crime, terrorism and 
criminal aspects of illegal immigration have gone through a process of securitization and have 
moved from the justice and home affairs agenda on the security agenda of the EU (Huysmans, 
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2000:  757). Since 2010 the EU has an Internal Security Strategy (ISS, 2010) which has 
contributed to the EU becoming an external actor on what originally belonged to the internal 
security agenda. As a consequence EU agencies with their remit in the EU's Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex have taken on traits of 
common European security providers with extensive mandates and means.  These internal 
security concerns have also found their way into an important foreign policy instrument of the 
EU: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).   
The complexity and broadness of the EU as a security actor is exemplified in that it also 
includes policy frameworks on civil protection, health security, food security, infrastructure 
protection, cyber crime and disaster relief (manmade or natural). As a consequence, the EU 
positions itself as a protector of its citizens against a vast array of insecurities and risks, both of 
external and internal nature (e.g.: European Council, 2009). The recognized need to tackle 
various transborder threats has therefore led to an increasingly institutionalized 'protection 
policy space' in the Union (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2008).  
The EU's capital and legititimization in the securirty field is its habitus as a broad security 
actor with an overlapping range of tasks to protect European citizens. The success of the EU to 
position itself dominantly in the European security field depends on the extent in which large 
scale, high intensity military interventions no longer constitute the main capital and whether the 
transformation to a broad notion of 'protection' security will continue. The backlash on the 
credibility of the EU in the security field after NATO in 2011 successfully carried out the UN 
Security Council's mandate to protect Libya's citizens, indicates that the military instrument in 
terms of visibility, credibility and legitimacy still carries a lot of weight. The ability to militarily act 
in emergency situations close to Europe's borders represents considerable capital. Therefore, 
despite the EU's clear advantage in its ability to act in a broad range of security issues, it still 
has to compete with those areas of military defence in which NATO holds more capital. The 
uncertainty and diversity of (future) threats make it “increasingly difficult to draw distinct lines 
between crisis management and defence, or between differentiating stages in the security 
continuum (emphasis in original citation)” (Huysmans 2006: 72; Oana Csernatoni, 2012: 224). 
Because of the continuum nature of the security field a clear cut division of the security field 






2.2 NATO and the European security field 
The development of NATO in the European security field mirror images that of the EU. For a 
long time it has been the most respected player in the European security field. From today’s 
perspective, the Cold War constituted a clear and unambiguous context in which the actors 
involved were well aware of the game played, the dominant rules and the most important 
capital. Well into the 1980s, security was all about survival of the state and protection against 
armed aggression. NATO’s core business was therefore the protection of the treaty area and the 
sovereignty of its member states. Security, according to the then prevailing doxa, equals 
defence, thus military capability formed the most important capital. NATO was the designated 
organization, both in terms of deterrence and maintaining the balance of power, and therefore 
the dominant and most influential actor in the field. Moreover, NATO’s illusio – “to keep the 
Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down” - offered a clear compass for the 
alliance. With this aim in mind,  the alliance could really be valued “the most successful alliance 
in history”, when the Soviet Union Collapsed in 1989. 
Institutionally, however, the organisation was less strong than it seems, as it was 
characterized by crises, tensions and disagreements between member states (Schwartz, 1983). 
NATO’s intergovernmental nature ultimately gives every member state the possibility to block 
the decision-making process. Although the United States is clearly the most dominant actor - 
followed by the United Kingdom and Germany and since its acceptance of full membership in 
2009 France - unanimity is warranted as it ensures that all should agree on the choices made, 
ranging from decisions concerning NATO’s Strategic Concept to individual targets during a 
military campaign. Legendre (2011: 137) therefore claims that the relationships between the 
member states are of major importance for the development of NATO. Besides the influence on 
the European security field, praxis and discourse of the alliance therefore also have an 
important organisational function, namely to bridge differences and unite member states, even 
with contrasting views (cf. Melissen, 1993). During the Cold War, however, the overriding 
commitment to the aforementioned illusio safeguarded the alliance against too much pressure. 
Things changed drastically after 1989. Military security has lost its dominant position on 
the political agenda. Cashing their “peace dividend” member states reallocate spending from 
military to peacetime purposes, and some were even questioning the usefulness of the 
organization. NATO was losing its grip on the security field, especially since its member states 
could not agree upon the above mentioned concepts of the security field, namely what is 
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security?; who are the main players?; which capital is important?; and which structures and 
rules define the field?  
NATO’s attempt to (re)define the (European) security field and its role in it, is thus 
seriously hampered by the divergence of visions. As an organisation, the alliance tries to bridge 
or encompass the differences in one overarching framework, which directs both security 
discourse and praxis. However, the differences in opinion are such that it is not clear what 
NATO is all about: “NATO … has become an amorphous, hard-to-describe-alliance of Western 
countries that believed NATO could be a world cop, reduce carbon emissions, rebuild nations, 
defend European borders, prevent money laundering and piracy, serve as a defense research 
and technology lab, and preserve Western values.” (Kashmeri, 2011: 21). However, even with 
this “grab bag self-image”, NATO has its own independent position in and influence on the 
security field. 
In order to regain some of its position, the alliance uses its Strategic Concept - a 
document which both outlines the main objectives of the organization and directs the 
deployment of resources - as a discursive means to make sense of the security field and 
NATO’s role in it. The security concept is therefore an important tool in NATO’s securitization 
and desecuritization movements. Until 1991 four of such concepts appeared - 1949, 1952, 1957 
and 1968 - all of which were secret and did not cover more than deterring or defending against 
a Soviet attack (Webber, 2011: 101). This changed with the first Strategic Concept in the post-
Cold War era (NATO, 1991). Although still rather Eurocentric, it stated that the security field has 
transformed as the nature of the threat has been changed from a certain threat to uncertain and 
multiple risks: "In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that 
remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and 
assess” (NATO, 1991). NATO could no longer focus on a well-known danger as it used to. 
Nevertheless, the organization envisioned an important role for itself, since the new strategic 
environment, according to this document, did not affect the security function of the alliance, "but 
rather underlines their enduring validity." (NATO, 1991) The Alliance kept its normative role as 
guardian of Western norms and values such as democracy and the free market. In the new 
strategic environment NATO considered its military knowledge and (kinetic) power as its most 
important asset and therefore as the most important capital in the European security field. 
Moreover, the organisation believed to be able to adapt its strategy to the new environment to 
achieve these objectives. Although the turbulent 1990s gave NATO a lot of headaches - think of 
the war in the Balkans - this opinion remained the dominant theme. The strategic concept of 
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1999, which hardly differs from that of 1991, formulates this as follows: “a Euro-Atlantic security 
structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part.” (NATO, 1999)  
NATO thus has recognized that the rules and regulations of the field (the doxa) has been 
changing, but it did not know in what direction. As its strategic concept offered hardly any 
guidance, it has to adapt to the new environment - learning - by doing. The role of NATO in the 
European security field after 1990, is determined largely by political and, especially, military 
actions in those years (cf. Aybet, 2010: 35), which also invoke three major cleavages in the 
alliance. In the first place this concerns the influx of new members in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Together with the EU and the OSCE, the alliance drew the former Eastern Bloc 
countries in the Western security community. NATO itself focused on the military aspects, such 
as the restructuring of the armed forces and the democratization of civil-military relations. 
Moreover, in the process, the security guarantee was extended to the east - perhaps the most 
attractive feature for the new member states. In the words of the strategic concept: "the Alliance 
has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in 
Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.” (NATO, 1991) Because of the influx of new 
member states, the European orientation and the importance of collective defence against 
Russia remained central values of the alliance. These member states – “new Europe” as former 
American Defence Secretary Rumsfeld called them - strongly adhere to the importance of 
Article 5 of the NATO treaty: an attack on one is an attack on all.  
The second major development occurred in the second half of the 1990s. Confronted 
with instability and atrocities in the Balkan the alliance went beyond the borders of the treaty-
area, and intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo. By going “out-of-area” NATO accepted a new role; 
besides the defensive mission in Europe, it became an organisation for carrying out offensive 
military missions. This new role based on Article 4 of the NATO treaty was formalized in the 
Strategic Concept in 1999 (Washington): “To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the 
Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that 
affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, 
and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.” (NATO, 1999) 
During the following decade and in response to different (unexpected) developments all kind of 
threats and security issues were added, such as cyber-attacks, energy security, and 
environmental and resource constraints (cf. NATO, 2010). This new role particularly fitted the 
American threat perception. International sponsored terrorism, the spread of WMD and the 
instability caused by failed and failing states were perceived as far greater threats than Russia. 
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If necessary, military intervention should give an answer to these threats, thus NATO should be 
converted into a global policeman and crisis manager.  
The third major development concerns the above mentioned development of the EU as a 
security actor, especially with regard to the definition of security. Based on the experiences in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the conclusion is made that military means in itself are not 
enough to solve contemporary threats. While NATO still has a strong emphasis on a military 
solution, the EU emphasizes the integrated and cooperative nature of security. Civilian 
capabilities for crisis management are as important to tackling current threats as military ones. It 
is acknowledged that external and domestic security threats are interrelated and therefore are in 
need of a combined internal and external approach. At first, NATO’s reaction to this 
development was rather negative, especially the United States accused Europe to be “soft, 
compromise-seeking peaceniks” (Kashmeri, 2011: 134). However, in the second half of the last 
decennium, NATO start recognizing that “relying on NATO’s Cold War-vintage solutions” is not 
enough anymore. In the Strategic Concept of 2010 (Lisbon) cooperative security is almost on 
equal footing with collective defence and crisis management. Moreover, the concept mentions 
the formation of “an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability” and 
“integrated civilian-military planning” (NATO, 2010). 
Instead of agreeing on one specific security vision, NATO tries to unite the differences 
into one overarching framework or habitus. In other words, NATO attempts to securitize both 
“old” and “new” aspects of security. However, as mentioned, this hampered the development of 
NATO as security actor in a changing world. In fact, it contributes to cases of tension, 
misperception and even geopolitical instability. A case in point is the development of a ballistic 
missile defence capability in Europe. The United States considers this the most preferable 
military solution to a potential Iranian threat; the Western European allies do not really believe in 
this solution and fear a deterioration in the relationship with Russia; while the Central and 
Eastern Europe allies consider it an American assurance against Russian aggression (cf. Van 
den Assem & Noll, 2007). The reluctant support and recent withdrawal of most of the European 
support from ISAF may be another example. The European allies for most part joined the 
mission because they were willing to support the American government – especially after 
NATO’s Iraq-tragedy - and not because they shared its threat-analysis. This of course influences 
the willingness to fight (cf. Kashmeri, 2011: 98-99). The war between Georgia and Russia in 
2008 can also (partly) be considered a consequence of this ambiguity. Counting on the 
robustness of NATO’s article 5 assurance, Georgia, considering itself almost a NATO-member, 
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launched an attack on South Ossetia. Russia responded with overwhelming force. The war did 
not escalate: NATO did not respond militarily and thus prohibited a wider conflict with Russia  
(cf. Kashmeri, 2011: 57-63). These are examples of the consequences of a mismatch between 
discourse and praxis. 
However, this does not mean that there is no progress in NATO’s thinking on security 
matters. On the contrary, with the benefit of hindsight some interesting developments can be 
noticed. Regarding the question “what is security”, the alliance is still divided into two camps - 
collective defence vs. collective security – but some progress is made. The Central and Eastern 
European allies’ approach of security prominently featured the most recent Security Concept, 
even more so than in 1991 or 1999: “NATO members will always assist each other against 
attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm 
and binding.” (NATO, 2010) This indicates a 're-securitization' of territorial integrity by NATO, 
spurred by the Georgia-conflict, the United States' waning commitment to Europe's security and 
to emphasize NATO's unique selling point vis-à-vis the EU. However, as mentioned, Crisis 
management and cooperative security are treated almost as important as collective defence. 
New, securitized, threats such as cyber wars, terrorism and energy security are global not 
regional in nature. Ringsmose and Rynning are certainly right to conclude that “NATO is 
becoming more global and also more political” (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2011: 7). Based on the 
experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, NATO has drawn the conclusion 
that a holistic approach, instead of a military one, is necessary in order to curb a crisis: “Our 
operational experiences have shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on 
their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. We reaffirm our Lisbon Summit 
decisions on a comprehensive approach.”(NATO, 2012a) In other words, there is a shift in the 
approach to capital in the security field. Though military capital is still highly valued, it is 
acknowledged that civilian capabilities are also important. NATO’s reaction to this is to enhance 
its civilian capacity. Not because it is planning to compete with other organisations, but “to 
interface more effectively with civilian partners.” (NATO, 2010) In practice, a more 
'comprehensive' NATO interferes with the habitus the EU has carved out for itself. Combined 
with a strong emphasis on partnerships – with for instance the UN, EU, Russia, Ukraine, 
Georgia, Mediterranean- and Gulf states, Australia, New Zealand and Japan (cf. NATO, 2010; 
2012a) – the alliance is developing itself as an indispensable (political and military) security 
partner or central security hub, in a global network of partnerships. This development underlines 
the above mentioned tension in the alliance between the U.S. 'global' agenda and the European 
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unwillingness to   contribute in practice. On the other hand, all agree upon the idea that the 
alliance remains a provider of multinational forces that could fight at short notice in a high-
intensity conflict (NATO, 2012b).  
Finally, concerning the structures and rules that define the security field, NATO seems to 
accept the 'double integrated’ nature of security: “Globalisation, emerging security challenges, 
such as cyber threats, key environmental and resource constraints … piracy, and terrorism, will 
continue to contribute to an unpredictable security environment.” (NATO, 2012b). In other 
words, the alliance has integrated traditional concepts of security - territory, sovereignty and 
threats to collective security – with a transnational approach to security, in which internal 
security and external security are intertwined (cf. Bigo, 2000). This not only means that civilian 
approaches and concepts – thus civilian know-how - enters the military field, but also the other 
way around. NATO’s approach to security – securitization - makes it possible to turn military 
knowledge and know-how to other fields than classical defence. Thus, NATO admits that the 
number of players in the security field has grown and that security is much more than it used to 
be – even sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations or the protection of children 
affected by armed conflict are part of NATO’s agenda (NATO, 2012a). But by being an 
indispensable partner in a global network, with an incomparable capacity of military resources 
and military know-how in an era in which military solutions can provide part of the answers to a 




Since 2000, the European security field has on the whole witnessed convergence of the EU and 
NATO habitus. This convergence has differed from period to period and was dependent on the 
situation. With the entry of the EU in the security field a convergence towards military 
understanding of capital in the security field occurred. However, as an inherently non-military 
and versatile organization, it turned out that the EU could not rival NATO's field position. 
Subsequently, the EU managed to contribute to the transformation of the meaning of security 
into a civil-military (or comprehensive) one and later on in a 'double integrated' one. The answer 
to the question “what is security” became quite encompassing and included a broad range of 
interconnected risks and threats requiring a chain of civilian and military means to counter them. 
In its turn, NATO adapted to this changed representation of capital in the security field, but 
remains the organisation with less legitimacy as a broad security provider.  
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Meanwhile, since the security field can be regarded as a continuum in which security 
represents different meanings in different situations and points in time, the ability to defend 
territory or intervene with high intensity capabilities in conflicts is still valuable. It is because of 
this many-faceted and complex appearance of security that neither the EU nor NATO are able to 
hold the monopoly of 'what security is'. It therefore depends on the situation what the hierarchy 
in the security field is. For example, in the anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, the EU 
carries more weight, because of the necessity to bring various kinds of means and policies to 
the security threat. Contrastingly, in the case of Libya in 2011, the capacity to conduct and 
execute air strikes on a large scale and with a long duration is NATO's turf. Then again: the 
wave of illegal immigrants on the southern areas of Europe that resulted from the Libya-conflict, 
was a matter in which the EU was expected to act. 
The securitization of societal security risks in the case of the EU and a 're'-securitization 
of Europe's territorial integrity by NATO shows that the EU and NATO are actively seeking to 
position themselves in the European security field in such a way that their strong points are 
brought to the fore and represent major capital. This paper shows that NATO's field strategy is 
one of securitizing a broad range of issues that before were in the civilian and/or political realm 
by introducing a 'militarization' of the means to tackle these threats. In field terms, a logical step, 
since NATO's abilities lie with military capabilities.  A Bourdieusian reading of what is going on in 
European security is therefore able to provide insight into what is securitized and why.  
Conceptualising European security as a Bourdieusian field also sheds light on the 
reasons of the almost non-existent EU-NATO cooperation on security. Often the bans by Cyprus 
and Turkey on each other's involvement in either EU's or NATO's business are cited as the main 
causes of this. Although the Cyprus-Turkey conflict is indeed a difficult diplomatic conundrum, 
our paper shows that EU-NATO divergence is more structural than this. The rival positions of 
the EU and NATO in the European security field, because of the overlap in their security 
functions and their competition to define what security is in a situation in which the definition of 
security is fluid and multi-interpretable, renders meaningful cooperation difficult. Bourdieusian 
fields are inherently conflictual and unless an (very unlikely) agent-merger occurs the European 
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